Fall of Assad's Syrian regime is bad news for Libya

For Russia, as for Iran, last month's fall of the 54-year-old Assad dynasty in Syria was a major geostrategic setback. The sudden defeat of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad threatened Russia's important military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Moscow is now believed to be trying to negotiate a continued presence with the new Syrian authorities. But it is also moving military equipment from Syria to neighboring Libya, apparently to establish or reinforce Russia's presence in that country as a new hub for its African operations. This could seriously undermine efforts to resolve Libya's protracted conflict.

The end of the al-Assad regime also has repercussions on Russia's growing presence in Africa. Moscow's naval and air bases in Syria have been the supply hubs for Russia's continental operations – mainly in Libya and also in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic and Sudan.

Al-Assad has hosted a major Russian military presence in Syria, with a warm-water naval base in the port of Tartus, an air base in Khmeimim in the north, near the port of Latakia, and a helicopter base in Qamishli in the far northeast. .

“The rapid collapse of the Assad regime in Syria – a regime the Kremlin has helped prop up since 2015 – is a strategic political defeat for Moscow and has thrown the Kremlin into crisis as it seeks to maintain its strategic military base in Syria.” the Institute for the Study of War said on December 9.

“Putin… intervened on Assad's behalf in 2015 to protect Russian military bases in Syria, support Russia's broader efforts to project power in the Mediterranean and Red Sea, increase its global presence in the Middle East and Africa, and threaten (the North Atlantic Treaty southern flank of the Organization).

“Russia is trying to secure its bases in Syria as opposition forces come to power, but Russia's continued military presence in the country is not guaranteed. (This) especially as Russia's actions in support of Assad over the past nine years have likely undermined Moscow's ability to form a lasting and positive relationship with the ruling Syrian opposition groups,” the institute said.

Uncertainty about who might form the new government also likely complicates these negotiations. And so, perhaps as a precaution, Moscow began transferring military resources to Libya, where it had already begun to reinforce its military presence in 2023/24.

“Four weeks ago, Russia suffered a clear setback in Syria – an outcome it had not planned for, as the loss of Assad undermines an important logistics center that, for nine years, supported its operations in Libya and beyond in Africa. Sub-Saharan,” a statement said. analyst at The Sentry, a US-based investigative and political organization, told ISS Today.

“In an attempt to preserve its African operations, Moscow has reinforced its presence in Libya to offset the deterioration of circumstances in Syria in recent weeks. And so far, it has done so without introducing a naval element – ​​at least not yet.

“Over the past four weeks, Russia has been transferring substantial amounts of military resources by air to Libya from Syria, Russia and Belarus.”

Several other reports in the mainstream media, as well as on intelligence websites, confirm several flights by large Russian Air Force cargo planes from Khmeimim Air Base in Syria to al-Khadim in Russia, near Benghazi in eastern Syria. Libya, in the last week of December. They speculate that the planes were carrying military equipment.

This week, Ukrainian intelligence sources who requested anonymity and other analysts said several Russian ships were scheduled to dock in Tartus. They said the roll on-roll off Sparta and Sparta II would be used to transport military equipment to Libya, although some would be transported back to Russia.

Russia's increased military presence in Libya threatens to perpetuate, if not worsen, the conflict in that country. Russia has for years supported eastern strongman General Khalifa Haftar's Benghazi-based government in his protracted fight with the United Nations-backed government in Tripoli.

In December, Abdul Hamid Dabaiba, prime minister of the national unity government in Tripoli, vehemently opposed Russia's reinforcement of Libyan bases. He said this was turning Libya into a base for great-power rivalries and would complicate the country's internal crisis.

It should also be noted that, in terms of the peace agreements between the rival Libyan parties, all foreign military personnel should have left Libya long ago.

“The sudden collapse of the Assad regime also raises questions about Russia's ability to continue providing military and security support to its allies,” says Denys Reva, researcher at the Institute for Security Studies. “It appears that Russia may currently be overwhelmed and unable to spare additional resources.”

He says that if Russia also lost its access to Libya, it would harm Moscow's ability to adequately support and supply its troops in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

“The Russians have definitely seen their situation deteriorate in Syria,” says The Sentry analyst. “Even if it is assumed that they will stay in Latakia and Tartus, the environment has become more uncertain, less convenient and more risky.

“By strengthening its presence in Libya, Russia may be trying to compensate for this deterioration in Syria – or at least part of it. If it did not do so, Moscow would be risking a weakening of its missions in sub-Saharan Africa.”

For Africa, the net effect of al-Assad's departure remains uncertain. A weakening of Russia's military presence on the continent would undoubtedly be positive, given its performance especially in the Sahel. In Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, Russia supports military regimes that seized power through coups d'état and is accused of serious abuses against civilians, without any visible improvement in containing terrorism.

For Libya, the likely consequences appear to be more unequivocally negative. By shifting the focus of its military operations to Libya, Russia acquired an even stronger incentive to entrench itself in that country and perpetuate the internal conflict, as Dabaiba warned.

Peter Fabricius, Consultant, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Pretoria